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CHANGING MARKETS TO ADDRESS 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
Peter Lehner* 
Abstract: This Keynote Address from the Boston College Environmental Af-
fairs Law Review 2007 Symposium, The Greening of the Corporation, examines 
the use of market pressures and incentives to encourage corporations to 
make more environmentally friendly decisions. Peter Lehner, Executive 
Director of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), draws on his 
experiences as a litigator and his work for the NRDC in explaining that 
changing markets will help decrease the impact that corporations have on 
global warming. 
 The Greening of the Corporation is a great topic. Although we often 
look at corporations as a big part of the problem—they are after all re-
sponsible for most pollution, deforestation, and natural resource deg-
radation—we must look to them as a big part of the solution if we are 
to deal with global warming and other major issues. 
 Of the top 150 largest global economic actors, ninety-one are cor-
porations and fifty-nine are countries. Companies like Wal-Mart, BP, 
CitiGroup, IBM, GE, and Exxon are bigger than many countries, in-
cluding significant countries such as Indonesia and South Africa. If we 
are going to achieve our goals in addressing global warming in the 
timeframe that we need to, corporations have to be part of the answer. 
 If we are going to address corporations, however, we are also going 
to have to address the world in which they operate, that is, the markets 
in which they operate. There are legal and institutional arrangements 
in which corporations function, which direct them, for example, to fo-
cus on achieving shareholder goals, such as maximizing productivity 
and profit; all are set to rules. The legal framework is set by the laws 
within which corporations act. The institutional and financial frame-
work is the particular market in which corporations operate and the 
incentives established. To really change corporate behavior, we need to 
address those frameworks. 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Director, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). “NRDC is the na-
tion’s most effective environmental action organization. We use law, science and the sup-
port of 1.2 million members and online activists to protect the planet’s wildlife and wild 
places and to ensure a safe and healthy environment for all living things.” NRDC: About 
Us, http://www.nrdc.org/about (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
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 We can generally think of greening a corporation in three differ-
ent ways, and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) is work-
ing on all these levels. The first approach is to green a company’s op-
erations. Many of these companies have significant footprints them-
selves. There is a lot that a company can do to change operations, 
whether it be, for example, Wal-Mart’s truck fleet, lights, or heating. 
Office Depot overhauled the lighting in its North American stores and 
obtained a ten percent absolute reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions.1 Wal-Mart has a Zero Waste initiative that so far has saved 
478.1 million gallons of water, 20.7 million gallons of diesel fuel, many 
millions of pounds of solid waste, and they did not even calculate their 
carbon footprint.2 So greening what corporations do themselves can 
make a big difference. 
 The second way that corporations can go green, or act in a more 
environmentally responsible manner, is through their supply chains. 
The NRDC reached an agreement with the Bowater Corporation, one 
of the largest paper corporations, on how it would source its paper,3 
and thus, what the company would demand from the timber compa-
nies from which it bought pulp. By working back up the supply chain, 
we use the power of the consumer. Since Bowater buys all the timber, if 
it insists on different environmental standards, the producers, the tim-
ber companies, will respond. Similarly, when enough law firms commit 
to buying only post-consumer recycled paper—in addition to recycling, 
of course—they are working through their supply chain, and will 
change what the paper companies produce. 
 We are also working in a similar way right now in China, where 
there is horrific pollution; you have never seen anything like it in this 
country. But it turns out that many polluters do not comply with the 
law, they don’t seem to care what the government says. On the other 
hand, if a company like the Gap says that it will not buy from Chinese 
companies unless they clean up their environmental performance, they 
will clean up very fast. So, we are now working on a program with the 
Chinese government to rank polluters on a scale of one to five—one is 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Office Depot Cuts CO2 Emission 10% Through Efficiency Upgrades, Environmental 
Leader, Aug. 29, 2007, http://www.environmentalleader.com/2007/08/29/office-depot-
cuts-co2-emissions-10-through-efficiency-upgrades (“The company also installed high-effic-
iency HVAC . . . .”). 
2 Steve Hochman, Green Supply Chains, Forbes.com, Apr. 20, 2007, http://www. 
forbes.com/2007/04/20/green-supply-chains-logistics-cx_sho_0420amr.html. 
3 Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Cumberland Plateau Forest Agreement to 
Protect Forests, Forest Jobs ( June 29, 2005), available athttp://www.nrdc.org/media/press 
releases/050629a.asp (announcing this agreement and its highlights). 
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good, five is bad—and also with a major American company, so that it 
will say that it will not buy from any Chinese factory that is a four or 
five. If we are successful, this approach will have a tremendous impact. 
 The last way one can green a corporation, the way that I am going 
to focus on, is to change entire markets: to change the ground rules 
within which companies are operating so the right incentives are sent 
throughout the companies’ operations. So, let us look at markets for a 
minute. There is no dispute that markets work extremely well in dis-
tributing goods and services. We can see this in the real price drop over 
the last hundreds of years of many of today’s basic staples. Adam Smith 
talked about this effect, referring to the invisible hand. Everyone’s in-
dividual actions, acting in self-interest—some might call it progress, 
others might call it greed—provide an efficient marketplace. But while 
this freedom has tended to work well for providing for economic pros-
perity, we have seen now that it works extremely poorly for certain types 
of goods. In particular, while it works for private goods—those that you 
can buy or sell and those where ownership of the goods by one person 
excludes ownership by another—it does not work very well for public 
goods. Classic public goods are, of course, clean air, clean water, and 
environmental protection. Another public good, that you can mention 
if you are ever debating this point with conservatives, is national secu-
rity. But a public good cannot be bought and sold in the marketplace, 
the same way a bottle of ginger ale can be bought and sold. In that 
sense, the market system fails us. I am going to explore a little bit why 
exactly that is and what we can do about it to address climate change. 
 Let me focus just a moment on climate change to set the stage for 
my discussion. The scientific debate, I think we can all agree, is over. 
Indeed, the scientific debate, I would venture, was largely an industry 
disinformation campaign for the last fifteen years. I brought a lawsuit in 
the late 1980s, suing the federal government over its lowering fuel 
economy standards.4 I was representing a group of cities focusing on 
local pollution; the NRDC brought a parallel case focusing on global 
warming and CO2. As far as we can tell, this was the very first climate 
change case. Nobody disputed the science. The judge noted in that 
case, in the D.C. Circuit, that the federal government did not dispute 
the science of climate change, that it was caused by human emissions of 
CO2, which were rising, and that if we did not address those emissions 
                                                                                                                      
4 See generally City of Los Angeles v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (discussing the link between CO2 and global warming). 
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soon, climate change was going to be a serious problem.5 The last fif-
teen years were really an unfortunate detour on the path to sound pol-
icy. 
 But today, again, we are no longer arguing the science. The Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as a group of scientists, 
always issues their predictions about climate change as a range. It turns 
out that in almost every instance, we are seeing that the upper end of 
that range—whether it is temperature, sea level rise, or precipitation 
changes—is proving more accurate. The last five years have seen the 
atmospheric concentration of CO2 grow by almost two parts per million 
per year, the fastest it has ever grown since records have been kept. 
 Now, the best we can hope for, the best that the IPCC and others 
hope for, is to stabilize atmospheric CO2 levels at about 450 parts per 
million. The preindustrial level was about 280. That, it is sobering to 
realize, is just the level that we think is plausible, but by no means cer-
tain, for avoiding catastrophe. There will still be very significant impacts 
around the world, many of which we are seeing now, whether they be 
the changed weather patterns, the wildfires in the West, the drought in 
the South, or the heat waves throughout the country. Those impacts 
will still happen, and they will get worse. But if we can manage to stabi-
lize the atmosphere at a concentration of 450 parts per million, then 
maybe we can avert catastrophe. We would generally hope for a little 
better than that, but that is what in fact we are aiming for right now. 
 To stabilize atmospheric concentrations at that level, we need to 
cut CO2 emissions—most of which are emitted by corporations or their 
products—by eighty percent by 2050, or perhaps even sooner. Let us 
look at some of the structural market failures that we need to address if 
we are going to enlist corporations in that battle—onto our side of the 
battle in fact—on climate change. 
 The first major market failure is that climate change is a classic ex-
ternality. Anyone can emit CO2 without having to pay any of the costs of 
the environmental damage caused by the emissions. The harms, 
whether they be rising sea levels, changing weather patterns, changing 
water supplies, or species extinction—none of those have a price. So 
companies can continue to emit all the CO2 they want and not pay a 
price. Society will pay that price, but the companies doing the emitting 
will not: a classic externality. 
                                                                                                                      
5 See id. at 493–94 & n.2. A majority of the court found that global warming was real 
and that there was a basis for standing to challenge automobile fuel economy standards, 
noting even then that “no one . . . appears to dispute the serious and imminent threat to 
our environment posed by a continuation of global warming.” Id. at 493–94. 
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 The problem has worsened in the United States and in many other 
countries because fossil fuel use is actually subsidized. Not only is CO2 
pollution free, it is actually encouraged. We subsidize oil and gas drill-
ing and coal burning both directly and indirectly. We actually changed 
the tax treatment and offered direct subsidies for fossil fuels in the En-
ergy Policy Act of 2005.6 Hopefully we will get a much better energy act 
in Congress this year.7 There are currently an estimated nine billion 
dollars of subsidies for coal, and six billion dollars worth of subsidies 
for the oil and gas industry.8 
 We subsidize coal indirectly by allowing coal-fired power plants to 
spew sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and mercury—in addition to 
CO2—into the air, and thus into our lungs almost for free. This pollu-
tion causes tens of thousands of early deaths each year and hundreds of 
thousands of hospital visits. These health effects cost society tens of bil-
lions of dollars that coal companies and power companies do not pay at 
all. 
 Another example is the real price of gasoline. If you were to truly 
include all the costs of gasoline—its health costs, its environmental 
costs, and perhaps even the costs of maintaining our supply of petro-
leum—it is estimated that gasoline would cost somewhere between five 
and fifteen dollars per gallon, rather than the three dollar cost that you 
see at the pump.9 
 Another way that we are subsidizing CO2 pollution is the tremen-
dous subsidy we have for our highway system. We heavily subsidize the 
use of motor vehicles so that vehicle miles traveled are going up and 
up. Of course, cars are responsible for about one-fourth to one-third of 
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. 
 One aspect of the fact that carbon is an externality is that nobody 
puts a price on it. Companies have no internalized incentive to reduce 
                                                                                                                      
6 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.). 
7 We did. After I gave this speech, Congress passed the Energy Independence and Se-
curity Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (to be codified in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.A. and 49 U.S.C.A.). Among its positives: a mandatory Renewable Fuel Stan-
dard of at least thirty-six billion gallons of biofuels by 2022, a substantial increase in the 
national fuel economy standards for automobiles to thirty-five miles per gallon by 2020, 
and increased energy efficiency standards for appliances. 
8 Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 401, 411–415, 421, 962–964, 1307, 1309, 1701–1704 
(coal), 342, 344–346, 353–354, 383, 1323, 1325–1326, 1329, 999A–999H (oil and gas). 
These estimates come from adding the tax breaks and other subsidies for coal and for oil 
and gas found in various provisions of the Act. 
9 See Int’l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment, The Real Price of Gasoline 34 (1998), 
available at http://www.ethanol.org/pdf/contentmgmt/The_Real_Price_of_Gas.pdf. 
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their carbon footprint. More than that, because there is no price on 
carbon, it is very hard for new or low-carbon energy systems to take the 
place of a fossil fuel system. What bank is going to invest in or loan 
money to somebody saying, “Well, I have a type of energy which is a lit-
tle bit more expensive than coal, but it does not produce any carbon”? 
If you are a bank, you are only looking at the income stream and the 
fact is that if the new energy source is more expensive than coal-fired 
power, you are not going to loan the money to that wind farm or solar 
factory. So we have a real problem when carbon has no price.10 
 A second major market failure is that there are both insufficient 
information and split incentives, particularly for energy efficiency. With 
standard incandescent lighting, ninety percent of the energy used is 
wasted. Only ten percent of it is coming out as light. Energy efficiency 
has tremendous opportunity to reduce our demand and lower pollu-
tion. It can also buy us time while we move away from a fossil fuel sys-
tem. 
 Yet, our energy efficiency implementation is woeful. Why is that? 
Partly because of a lack of information. We do not know or trust the 
information we get when we have an opportunity. For example, should 
I really pay an extra one hundred dollars for some different refrigera-
tor because it says that it is going to save me money over three years? Is 
it really? I do not really trust that. I think cash in the hand is worth a lot 
more. 
 In addition, there are split incentives, which are significant in this 
country. If you are a builder of houses who will also sell the houses, you 
are by and large thinking about the price at which you will sell the 
house. The buyer is similarly interested in the first price. So you have 
little incentive to spend extra money on the house to make it very well-
insulated because you are the builder and you are not going to pay the 
heating bill. Similarly, if you are a landlord, you are happy to buy the 
                                                                                                                      
10 We are making progress here. Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, and JPMorgan Chase re-
cently announced a set of Carbon Principles, the first of their kind in the banking world. 
See Jeffrey Ball, Wall Street Shows Skepticism Over Coal, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 2008, at A6. Finan-
cial institutions that adopt the Principles commit to encouraging their clients to invest in 
cost-effective energy efficiency measures, renewable energy projects, and other low-carbon 
energy technologies. Id. If properly implemented, these Principles, and the accompanying 
new carbon aware due diligence process, which explicitly takes into account the financial 
and regulatory risks of investing in new fossil fuel generation, should help dissuade utili-
ties from investing in new dirty coal plants. The Bank of America agreed to these princi-
ples on April 1, 2008. Press Release, Bank of America, Bank of America to Announce 
Adoption of the Carbon Principles at Natural Resources Defense Council Tenth Annual 
Award Event (Apr. 1, 2008), http://bankofamerica.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_ 
releases&item=8124. 
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cheapest appliance because your tenants, not you, will pay the utility 
bill. This split incentive applies to large segments of the economy: 
commercial landlords versus tenants, manufacturers versus users of ap-
pliances, and many others. It largely eliminates any incentive for those 
who are in control to go for energy efficiency. 
 A third and related problem here is the very unrealistic return ex-
pectations most consumers and many businesses have. People often 
talk about the need to have an energy efficiency program pay for itself 
in three or five years. Well, think about that. Say you have a three or five 
year payback for an energy efficiency program, such as insulating your 
house. You buy a house and you get a thirty-year mortgage; why should 
energy efficiency pay back over three years? A three-year payback is ac-
tually the equivalent of almost a twenty-five percent rate of return. You 
are not getting that in your invested money anywhere. If you could get 
an absolutely risk-free ten-percent return, you would be doing well. You 
cannot do that in the bond market or the treasury bill market. And yet 
a ten-percent return is a seven-year payback. But, the reality is that most 
companies and most people do not go for seven-year paybacks. Some-
how, they think that doubling their money because of an energy effi-
cient device in seven years is far beyond what is reasonable for them. 
So, in fact, consumers are acting, in a sense, irrationally. They will thus 
miss the chance for very effective investments and energy efficiency, 
while they meanwhile are investing their money or savings at a far less 
lucrative rate of return. 
 Another market difficulty is the instability of the oil market. It has 
gone up and down and up and down. The natural gas market is the 
same. This fluctuation makes it difficult to finance any alternative en-
ergy proposal. Even if it may be profitable today at eighty dollars to one 
hundred dollars a barrel for oil, that proposal is unlikely to get financ-
ing because it is unclear that it will still be able to compete over two or 
three years when the price of oil may be $150, but also may drop down 
to forty dollars again. And because of the push in many utility indus-
tries and state regulatory commissions to prohibit, or provide disincen-
tives for, long-term contracts forcing utilities to buy energy on the spot 
market, we have effectively created a major disincentive to long-term 
investments in clean energy alternatives. 
 The last market failure is the problem of fast followers. If you in-
vent something new that may be great, but have many others who can 
quickly follow in your footsteps, it is hard for you to recoup the re-
search and development cost or that initial market advantage that you 
might have had. If you are the first to go through the legal and admin-
istrative hurdles of siting a wind farm, you will have no long-term ad-
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vantage over the guy who comes second. There is no brand loyalty 
here. 
 One important example of this problem is carbon capture and 
sequestration, which, as you know, is the technology of taking from a 
coal-fired power plant the CO2 stream and pumping it into the ground. 
That way, it is not released into the atmosphere. This system works, and 
has a lot of promise, but nobody yet is doing it for a commercial-scale 
power plant. It is being done with respect to enhanced oil recovery. 
Part of the reason for that is the tremendous research and develop-
ment costs that would go into such a system. And, once it has been 
proven, it is not necessarily the case that you, the coal or energy com-
pany that invented this technology, or got this concept working, will 
stand to be at much of a competitive advantage with respect to your 
competitors. 
 So these are all real market failures, and they are all failures that 
we need to address if we are to enlist corporations in the battle against 
global warming. As I said earlier, each corporation can and should 
clean up its carbon footprint. And each company can and should ad-
dress its supply chain. But, in the policy area, we also have to figure 
ways to change these incentives (or disincentives). 
 How are we going to do that? Well, the first and most significant 
way is to address that first problem I mentioned: we have to put a price 
on carbon. That is probably the most significant step we can take in the 
next couple of years. As you probably know, that is indeed the envi-
ronmental battle going on in Washington right now. Just two or three 
days ago, Senators Lieberman and Warner introduced a bill that will 
have a declining cap for carbon emissions.11 To emit a ton of CO2, one 
must have a CO2 allowance. The cap creates scarcity and scarcity creates 
a price. The NRDC argues that since the atmosphere should be consid-
ered to belong to all of us, to the public, then a private company should 
pay the public for the right to dump CO2 into it. The polluter should 
pay for the allowances. The polluters, however, are very powerful politi-
cally so the Lieberman-Warner bill, while it makes polluters pay for 
some allowances, also gives away many for free to the polluters. Then, 
                                                                                                                      
11 A Bill to Direct the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to Establish 
a Program to Decrease Emissions of Greenhouse Gases, and for Other Purposes, S. 2191, 
110th Cong. (2007); see Natural Res. Def. Council, NRDC Legislative Facts, Lieberman-
Warner Climate Security Act (Dec. 2007), http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/factsheets/ 
leg_07121101A.pdf. The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee supported the 
bill, eleven to eight, and the U.S. Senate is expected to consider the bill on the floor in June 
2008. 
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over a twenty-year timeframe, the ratio of those given away for free 
would change. But fundamentally what this bill would do is to put a 
price on carbon. 
 Now, some have said that we should have a carbon tax, which 
would also directly put a price on carbon. The answer is, that would be 
fine. And in many ways, a system where the government auctions all the 
allowances—that is, makes the polluter pay for all of them—and a car-
bon tax, are very similar. The northeastern states have joined in the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which will cap CO2 pollution from 
power plants.12 Polluters will have to buy all allowances. We strongly 
support this system. The reality we are always told, however, is that de-
spite the fact that most economists will argue for a carbon tax over a 
cap and auction system, a tax is not politically feasible in Washington 
these days. So that is why, you will see, the effort is to put a price on 
carbon by putting a cap on carbon. It may not seem quite as direct, but 
in fact it does effectively work that way. 
 Another way to put a price on carbon, beyond the legislative ap-
proach, is seen in the recent leveraged buyout of TXU by several ven-
ture funds.13 TXU owned a number of coal-fired power plants and had 
plans to build another eleven coal-fired power plants in Texas, and an-
other twenty to thirty in other states in the country. The possible buyers 
of TXU were concerned that this deal was going to get a lot of envi-
ronmental opposition and that opposition would make it harder to fi-
nance the deal. The issue here is not putting a price on carbon legisla-
tively, but making it harder to finance the deal, making the price of the 
deal more expensive because of the carbon emissions. So one of the 
buyers called the NRDC to see if we could reach a deal. We, with Envi-
ronmental Defense, worked with the buyers of TXU, and they agreed 
to drop their plans for eight of the eleven plants in Texas and all of the 
twenty to thirty plants that they were planning in other states. We were 
allowed to keep going fighting the three that they were going to try to 
move ahead in Texas. As a result of that deal, much of the opposition to 
the deal was withdrawn. That exchange effectively put in the private 
market, not the public market, a price on carbon. 
 Another example of what we can do is to put new standards in 
place for energy efficiency. In an area where there are split incentives 
among landlords and tenants, manufacturers and consumers, and 
                                                                                                                      
12 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), http://www.rggi.org (last visited Apr. 
30, 2008). 
13 Michael J. de la Merced, Financing for TXU Deal Is a Test for Debt Markets, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 15, 2007, at C2, available at 2007 WLNR 20213494. 
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owners and builders, the clear answer is to have policy changes to man-
date efficiency. The easiest examples of those types of standards, being 
debated by Congress now, are vehicle efficiency standards, or corporate 
average fuel economy (CAFE) standards. We have not had an increase 
in the fuel economy standards for this country since 1975, for thirty-two 
years.14 Now technology, needless to say, has advanced a lot since then. 
And, unfortunately, most of it has gone into making the cars bigger and 
bigger. So actually with the advent of SUVs, as I am sure that you all 
know, the average fuel economy of the American fleet has gone down. 
That is far more significant in terms of our oil importation than any 
other factor. Again, the car companies do not pay the gasoline bill, you 
do. The car companies themselves have relatively little incentive to 
make their cars a lot more efficient, although perhaps the American 
car companies are beginning to learn from the fact that Toyota has 
steadily increased its market share from a relatively small company to 
now almost the world’s largest automobile manufacturer. But, in order 
to address this split incentive for efficiency, as well as a lack of trust in 
any information there is, and an unrealistic return rate for efficiency, 
we need mandated standards to guide the market. There is still plenty 
of room, with higher standards, for companies to innovate, cut costs, 
compete, and use different technology. But this market needs new 
rules.15 
 Another example: I brought a case not too long ago where the 
U.S. Department of Energy had been mandated to improve the effi-
ciency of a whole range of household appliances. They did not. They 
were over a decade late for many of these mandates. So, a coalition of 
states and the NRDC sued the Department of Energy, and, after litiga-
tion, entered into a settlement.16 The Department of Energy is now im-
plementing these standards. These standards, covering household ap-
pliances like ovens and fans, will have the equivalent carbon effect of 
taking twenty million cars and trucks off the road. They will save con-
                                                                                                                      
14 After this speech, Congress raised federal CAFE standards in the Energy Independ-
ence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102, 121 Stat. 1492 (to be codified at 
49 U.S.C.A. § 32,902). 
15 The recent CAFE increase is a very good start, but the miles-per-gallon standard 
could be even higher and more quickly implemented. We also need a federal standard for 
CO2 emissions from automobiles. 
16 See New York ex. rel Lockyer v. Bodman, No. 05 Civ. 7808, 2007 WL 3238763, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2007) (listing the NRDC as a plaintiff); Press Release, Office of the N.Y. 
State Attorney Gen. Andrew M. Cuomo, Dep’t of Law, Federal Energy Dept. to Improve 
Appliance Efficiency (Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/ 
nov/nov13a_06.html (providing a link to the consent decree). 
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sumers money. They will be virtually invisible to consumers, because 
consumers will still have their toasters and their fans, but without the 
equivalent of twenty million cars and trucks on the road—a huge bene-
fit in the global warming battle. 
 Another market failure I mentioned is the lack of information. If 
you wanted to build a green building not too long ago, you would not 
really know what exactly to do. And if you did a green building, you 
would not necessarily get credit for it; if you say it is green, how does 
anyone know whether you are being honest or not? To address this 
problem, the U.S. Green Building Council, the NRDC, and others 
formed what is now known as LEED, Leadership in Energy and Envi-
ronmental Design.17 You can now get your building certified as LEED 
Platinum if it is really terrific, LEED Gold, or LEED Silver. Builders 
know what to do and buyers know what they are getting. The NRDC 
also just recently developed what is called LEED-ND, or LEED for 
Neighborhood Development, so not only individual buildings, but en-
tire communities can now be certified for their environmental compli-
ance. Market failures can be fixed. 
 I will mention just one more market change. In most states, utili-
ties make money by selling electricity, and, because of their ratio be-
tween fixed costs and variable costs, they make a lot of money with 
every additional kilowatt-hour they sell. Or phrased differently, if a cus-
tomer is more efficient, the utility loses revenue, which is almost all 
profit. They do not like that very much. Utilities, however, are the ma-
jor players in the energy market. They send you bills every month. They 
run the system because they buy the energy, they sell it to you, and they 
control all the wires in between. If we can change the utility rate struc-
ture, so that a utility, instead of having a strong economic disincentive 
towards energy efficiency, has an economic incentive for customers to 
increase efficiency, we will transform the utilities from being a major 
opponent of efficiency and clean energy to being a proponent.18 Cali-
fornia was the first state to do that. Idaho, not generally considered an 
environmental leader, was the second. New York has recently done that. 
And the NRDC is working with many other states to make similar utility 
rate reforms. By changing the structure of the market, we take these 
                                                                                                                      
17 U.S. Green Building Council, LEED Rating Systems, http://www.usgbc.org/Dis- 
playPage.aspx?CMSPageID=222 (last visited Apr. 30, 2008) (providing information on all 
the LEED rating systems). 
18 See generally Richard F. Hirsch, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and 
Restructuring in the American Electric Utility System (1999) (providing a de-
tailed discussion of energy utility deregulation). 
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tremendously powerful players and instead of being on the other side, 
we make them become allies in the battle against global warming. 
 Reducing global warming will take a lot of work on all levels: indi-
vidual, academic, governmental, and corporate. We need to get com-
panies to not just be a part of the problem, but actually be a part of the 
solution. We have to change the rules that they play by. By and large, 
they will play by the rules. It is our job, as those working in the public 
policy arena, to change the rules and then it will be their job to address 
the shareholder needs, employee needs, and community needs within 
those changed rules in a way that will better affect and address climate 
change. 
